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The Savage Wars of Peace: 
Rhetorics of Imperialism from the White Man’s 
Burden to the War on Terror
Will Barton
The White Man's Burden
1899
THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Take up the White man's bur-den --
Send forth the best ye breed -- Go 
bind your sons to exile To serve 
your captives' need; To wait in hea-
vy harness On fluttered folk and wild 
-- Your new-caught, sullen peo-ples, 
Half devil and half child. Take up the 
White Man's burden -- In patience to 
abide, To veil the threat of terror 
And check the show of pride; By o-
pen speech and simple, An hundred 
times mad plain. To seek another's 
profit, and work another's gain. Take 
up the White Man's burden -- The 
savage wars of peace -- Fill full the 
mouth of Famine And bid the sick-
ness cease; And when your goal is 
nearest The end for others sought, 
Watch Sloth and heathen Folly Bring 
all your hope to nought. Take up the 
White Man's burden -- No tawdry 
rule of kings, but toil of serf and 
sweeper -- The tale of common 
things. The ports ye shall not enter, 
the roads ye shall not tread, Go 
make them with your living, and 
mark them with your dead! Take up 
the White man's burden -- And reap 
his old reward: The blame of those 
ye better, The hate of those ye 
guard -- The cry of hosts ye humour 
(Ah, slowly!) toward the light: --
"Why brou-ght ye us from bondage, 
"Our loved Egyptian night?" Take up 
the White Man's burden -- Ye dare 
not stoop to less -- Nor call too loud 
on freedom To cloak your weari-
ness; By all ye cry or whisper, By all 
ye leave or do, The silent, sullen 
peo-ples Shall weigh your Gods and 
you. Take up the White Man's bur-
den -- Have done with childish days 
--The lightly proffered laurel, the ea-
sy, ungrud-ged praise. Comes now, 
to search your manhood through all 
the thankless years, Cold-edged 
with dear-bought wisdom, the judg-
ment of your peers!
-Rudyard Kipling
22
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The Savage Wars of Peace
s the nineteenth century drew to a close, the United States 
was engaged in fierce debate over whether to engage in 
expansionist and unilateral military action employing mas-
sive military superiority for material gain in Cuba, Puerto 
Rico, Guam and the Phillipines. Mark Twain, a member of 
the Anti-Imperialist League, rewrote the Battle Hymn of the Republic:
Mine eyes have seen the orgy of the launching of the sword
He is searching out the hoardings where the stranger’s wealth 
is stored;
He has loosed his fateful lightning, and with woe and death has 
scored;
His lust is marching on.
(Cited in Paterson et al, 1995, 20-24)
Twain’s faction lost the argument. After the sinking of the USS 
Maine at Havana, Congress voted for war against Spain and the United 
States became, albeit not in name, an imperialist power. One of the 
leaders of the war party was Theodore Roosevelt who resigned his post 
as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in order to lead his Rough Riders 
into battle.
In February, 1899, Roosevelt’s friend, Rudyard Kipling, the unofficial 
laureate poet of British imperialism, published to the American people 
his heartfelt plea for them to take up their share of the god given duty of 
the white race to civilise the rest of the world. On the very day that The 
White Man’s Burden was published, Fillipinos rose against the Ame-
rican colonists who had replaced the Spanish ones. On the following 
day, US forces were committed to the suppression of the Phillipines.
The White Man’s Burden is a remarkable, if distasteful poem and, 
while hardly representative of Kipling’s work, has been responsible for a 
significant proportion of the loathing felt by many people for him.  Des-
pite his reputation, Kipling was by no means a crude racist. In works 
such as the Ballad of East and West (although its refrain is often quoted 
out of context to make it seem the opposite) he specifically opposes ra-
cism and asserts that good men are equal despite their skin colour.  
Kipling had been brought up by and among Indian Hindus and had a 
love and respect for their culture. Yet The White Man’s Burden is un-
doubtedly a bluntly and offensively racist work.  He invites his reader
To wait in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild -
Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
Half-devil and half-child
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This seems to be a crude piece of propaganda and an ambivalent 
and ineffective one at that. The ostensible message of progress and 
duty is undercut by a tone of great bitterness and a sense of futility.  
The white man foreswears the easy life of civilisation to take its benefits 
to others. Empire is in the interests not of the imperialists but of the 
subject people, although they are unable to see this. The white man’s 
sacrifice, although a divine duty, will be unappreciated. His reward will 
be “The blame of those ye better,/The hate of those ye guard” and not 
only will he receive no thanks from these, their laziness and stupidity 
will render much of the cost in vain:
Take up the White Man’s Burden -
The savage wars of peace -
Fill full the mouth of Famine
And bid the sickness cease;
And when your goal is nearest
The end for others sought,
Watch Sloth and heathen Folly
Bring all your hope to nought.
Nevertheless, the task must be undertaken, for it is right.
As a recruitment ad for empire builders, it sends a very mixed mes-
sage, but perhaps that is not the point. After all, hard headed colonists 
out to profit from sweated native labour are not going to be swayed by 
poetry. The function of The White Man’s Burden is rather mythological 
than directly propagandist. Its injured tone, its resentment at lack of ap-
preciation and its absolute certainty of the rightness of its position feed 
the hypocrisy, cant and self-deception that in the twentieth century were 
to become the hallmark of the imperialist consciousness. It is the self-
serving rhetoric of the sadistic schoolmaster who administers beatings 
claiming “this hurts me more than it hurts you”. It is the lie of the abusive 
parent who is only chastising the child for its own good.
And it is the voice of Tony Blair taking his country to a war that it cle-
arly and expressly does not want to undertake, for the good of the cou-
ntry we are attacking, who also, ungratefully, do not want to be atta-
cked. All done with the quiet confidence that God is on his side, despite 
the fact that the Pope, the Archbishop of Canterbury and most of the 
worlds religious leaders repeatedly urged He was not.
State Rhetorics of Terrorism
Within modernity, revolutionary glamour and terrorism have con-
stantly been opposed to the state’s claimed monopoly of death and 
glory. In 1988, Guy Debord, looking back over twenty years of politics 
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since the finest hour of Situationism, identified the characteristics of a 
form of state in which traditional political discourse was rendered trivial, 
since “For the first time in contemporary Europe no party or fraction of a 
party even tries to pretend that they wish to change anything signi-
ficant.” (Debord, 1998; 21). In such a state, where the Society of the 
Spectacle (Debord, 1994) has replaced democratic debate and the role 
of effecting change in society and culture has been handed over by go-
vernment and the state to the market, a logical spiral leads inexorably to 
conflict between the residual state (still seeking to maintain its central 
raison d’etre; the monopoly of violence and any force that opposes the 
status quo. The injured tones of politicians complaining of the Ingra-
titude of the people are delightfully captured:
But of all social crimes, none must be seen as worse than the 
impertinent claim to still want to change something in a society 
which has so far been only too kind and patient; but has had 
enough of being blamed. 
          (Debord, 1998; 27; italics in original).
Wars, even Wars Against Terror, can achieve little in a market-
governed world. They can uphold and endorse the decisions of the 
market, but will never be able significantly to oppose them, since the 
financial resources to prosecute such a war could not, by definition, be 
made available. As I have argued elsewhere, the function of war at 
least since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 has shifted fundamentally 
from one of coercion, operative primarily in the theatre of action, to one 
of rhetoric, operative principally in the sphere of media consumption.  
(Barton Catmur, 2000). In the case of the interventions in the Balkans, 
this was also the opinion of Hume (2000, 77): “… this anti-Nazi crusade 
was staged primarily for the benefit of the Westerners involved”
Since the main aim of war is now to present a media event securing 
the acquiescence and compliance of the domestic population, war 
fought against other sovereign states for territory or strategic advantage
does not play well. What is required is a war against Bad People. Since 
the Society of the Spectacle provides all good things to all good people, 
the enemy must, perforce be someone, not merely with different obje-
ctives, but motivated by clear and unrelieved malevolence.
Such a perfect democracy constructs its own inconceivable 
foe, terrorism. Its wish is to be judged by its enemies, rather 
than by its results. The story of terrorism is written by the state 
and is therefore highly instructive. The spectators must cer-
tainnly never know everything about terrorism, but they must 
always know enough to convince them that, compared with 
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terrorism, everything else must be acceptable, or in any case 
more rational and democratic. 
    (Debord, 1998; 24; italics in original).
Because the Society of the Spectacle is perfect, opposition to it can 
only be motivated by unreasoning hatred, religious fanaticism or, in the 
last resort, sheer Evil. Because of this, both terrorism and the war agai-
nst it are condemned to operate in secrecy, through conspiracy.  
States which originated in armed struggle, revolutionary violence, 
genocide or ethnic cleansing are quick to categorise those using such 
methods against them as common criminals, motivated by irrational for-
ces of religious or cultural hatred (“They hate our freedom and democ-
racy”). Cultures currently in denial about their own violent underpin-
nings, yet enraged by attacks upon them, notably Israel and the US 
construct narratives of denial and rewritings of history to facilitate a dis-
course of righteous violence, justified as retaliation or prevention.
Cultures in denial about their own violence employ rhetoric of 
counter insurgency as a mask for repression. In the American War on 
Terror, an ideology of the US as a passive victim of powerful and evil 
forces is being constructed and reinforced by an ahistorical history pro-
pagated through popular culture. Recent Hollywood productions have 
furthered this vision.
Tony Blair’s Pearl Harbor
On September 11, 2001, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was 
about to address the Trade Union Congress when the news of the at-
tack on New York came through. Blair went immediately to the rostrum 
where he announced the news and explained that in accordance, he 
was sure, with the wishes of delegates, he would leave immediately to 
ensure that Britain stood shoulder to shoulder with her American Ally at 
this time. There is much to commend in Blair’s performance. He is ad-
mirably calm, firm and decisive. He speaks briefly and to the point and 
creates the convincing impression of a leader exercising firm control in 
a crisis.  
That air of quite competence and determination contrasts strongly 
with his demeanour prior to receiving the news. Blair was facing a pote-
ntially hostile crowd and was going to be called upon to justify unpo-
pular measures that favoured Capital and business at the expense of 
the workers represented by the delegates in the hall. He clearly felt 
more at ease in the role of international statesman than that of a poli-
tician confronting his constituents.
Blair was insistent that Britain must stand alongside the US “shoul-
der to shoulder” just as the US had stood by Britain in the war against 
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fascism. Here a remarkable elision of history occurs. Blair likened 9/11 
to the London Blitz, implying that the US had been supportive of Britain 
at that time. In fact, at the time of the London Blitz, America was main-
taining studied neutrality and her ambassador to London was regularly 
advising the President that Britain’s fall to Hitler was only months, if not 
weeks away.
Blair’s approach conforms to a revisionist view of history which is 
making considerable headway within the popular culture and understan-
ding of the English speaking world. In this alternative history, the USA, 
acting from no motive beyond truth, freedom, democracy etc., volunta-
rily enters the war on Britain’s side and makes the world safe for truth, 
freedom, democracy, etc.    
What is truly disconcerting about the British Premier’s adoption of a 
wilful misreading of Anglo-American history is that it was exactly prefi-
gured only months earlier in Pearl Harbur (Brookheimer, 2001). This 
film portrays a serving USAF pilot fighting for the RAF in the Battle of 
Britain at a time when the US was a neutral power. Hollywood has al-
ways been happy to mythologise the role of the US in war and history, 
as have most national cinemas for their own nations. The difference 
between Pearl Harbor and, for instance U571 Mostow, 2000) is impor-
tant, however. While the latter merely transposes the credit for a parti-
cular action from the British to the US Navy, the former portrays an 
entirely revisionist political history.
Retheorising Warfare after Vietnam
What was at the time perceived within and outside America as the 
defeat of US forces and the victory of Ho Chi Minh’s NLF occupies an 
important place in the history of war politics. In the early part of thew 
war it must have seemed inconceivable to many Americans that their 
massive technical, economic and numerical superiority would not make 
victory inevitable. The undignified scramble to get out of Saigon at its 
fall was widely interpreted as demonstrating the weakness even of a 
global superpower in the face of a united and hostile population enga-
ged in guerilla struggle, and also, by many socialists as indicating the 
direction in which history was flowing.
Subsequent events have made possible a recontextualisation of that 
conflict as a battle within a larger war - a war, moreover, in which the 
US won.
This is contained within the thesis of a remarkable book, The Shield 
of Achilles, by Philip Bobbitt (2002). Bobbitt’s contention is that the 
conflicts of Europe and the US from 1914 to the 1990s should be seen 
as a single war between democracies and undemocratic regimes, in 
which the former emerge victorious with the fall of the Soviet Union. In 
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the course of this epic struggle, the state in the more economically 
advanced countries undergoes a transformation from Nation State to 
“Market State”. Bobbitt’s taxonomy of historical state forms, including, 
inter alia, the Princely State, the State-Nation and so on may be idio-
syncratic but has about it a certain logic so long as one accepts the 
limits within which his study is confined.
Despite his invocation of Homer, Bobbitt is concerned almost exclu-
sively with the history of modern Europe and North America. Thus, the 
two designated World Wars, the Russian Revolution and civil war, the 
Spanish war, the Cold War and colonial liberation struggles are all part 
of the big picture. Postcolonial Africa, in which for half a century large 
scale war has been a constant presence, is hardly mentioned.
This is not the place to debate the validity or otherwise of Bobbitt’s 
classification of state forms in renaissance and early modern Europe, 
productive as that may be for historians and political scientists. The im-
portant distinction for our purposes is the transition he identifies from 
Nation State to Market State. The Nation State is the product of 19th 
century European nationalism. It is posited on the ethnic, religious and 
cultural unity of a people, located in a geographic space largely or ex-
clusively occupied by them. The market state is multicultural and multie-
thnic. It commands the loyalty of its citizens, not through blood and soil 
but by satisfying their consumer demands. Its citizens are bound toget-
her only by economic considerations and may well be highly diverse 
ideologically, even to the point that many may oppose the regime for 
religious, ethnic or political reasons. It is defended, not by great cons-
cripted citizen armies but by a professional standing army. Because of 
its internal tensions, this has to be supplemented by increasingly power-
ful and clandestine “security forces” - in other words a much expanded 
secret police:
A state that privatizes most of its functions by law will inevitably 
defend itself by employing its own people as mercenaries -
with profound strategic consequences. A state threatened with 
cy-berattacks on its interdependent infrastructures can protect 
it-self by virtually abolishing civil privacy or by increasing official 
surveillance and intelligence gathering or by expensively de-
centralizing. Each course has profound constitutional cones-
quences.  
Bobbitt (2002)
Bobbitt is good enough to acknowledge that much of his thesis is 
owed to others - notably to Eric Hobbsbawm’s conception of the short 
20th Century. Whilst, however, it makes sense for a Marxist and post-
communist historian to identify the period of the existence of the USSR 
as distinct and distinctive, it is less obviously appropriate to Bobbitt who 
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seeks to conflate communism and fascism and see the whole period as 
a single war between democracy and totalitarianism. 
Such a thesis is somewhat harder to sustain when one remembers 
that the USA and USSR were allies from 1942-45 and that the Soviet 
contribution to the defeat of the Third Reich was massive and arguably 
greater than that of America, certainly involving considerably more sac-
rifice.
The elision of such inconvenient facts is facilitated by the general 
tendency of Hollywood to write out from its war stories any contribution 
of its allies. The only narrative function of the RAF in Pearl Harbour is to 
provide the aeroplane in which the American hero can defend England.  
Once he is shot down, the Battle of Britain is over for the purposes of 
the film. In Saving Private Ryan (Spielberg, 1998) the only flag, beside 
Old Glory, is the French Tricoleur flying over the war cemetry at the sta-
rt of the framing narrative. The Germans are seen entirely from the
American’s perspective, rarely speak (other than to shout war cries or to 
surrender) and are as dehumanised an enemy as the orcs in Lord of the 
Rings (Jackson, 2001, 2002). The only other non-Americans are the 
French peasant family who put in a brief appearance. From their 
costumes, they seem to have strayed onto the set from filming Jean de 
Florette (although their accents give them away) and are unders-
tandably bewildered. They add nothing to the plot development.  Holly-
wood’s reading of the war is clear - all the important stuff was done by 
Uncle Sam.
Bobbitt’s market state theory and the re-reading of 20th century 
history undertaken by Hollywood and implicit in the rhetoric of Bush and 
Blair offers a Disneyfication of the comparative roles of Western powers 
in the conflicts of the last long or short century. This can be glossed as 
the view that Europe was essentially politically unstable and unable to 
resolve its conflicts, that in both World Wars, the US intervened for lar-
gely moral reasons and that that intervention was decisive on the side 
of right. It then protected Western Europe from the predations of the 
Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact until the moral superiority of free market 
capitalism proved economically more resilient than state socialism.  
With the collapse of the USSR and its socialist satellites, the world en-
ters a new phase of history, freed from the fear of massive superpower 
nuclear confrontation.
The theory has been voiced many times by many people but never 
better than in a letter from Mr Herb Greer (2002) to the Spectator.  Wri-
ting “as an American living in England”, Greer castigated the timid Bri-
tish for their failure to offer wholehearted support to the USA’s war on 
Terror and related aggression against Iraq. Specifically he made the as-
sertion that America had entered the second world war in order to save 
thye world from fascism and Britain from German invasion, or to use his 
own delicate terminology: “If it wasn’t for the Yankees, mate, you’d all 
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be speaking Kraut.” This drew a response from the novellist Michael 
Moorcock, (2003) writing “as an Englishman living in America” and poin-
ting out that the USA was at war with Germany because Hitler had in 
fact declared war on the USA, somewhat after the threat of invasion of 
Britain had been lifted by the opening of the Eastern front.
Rather than embracing their liberators, many Europeans (like, it 
seems, many Iraqis today) were deeply suspicious of American motiva-
tion during the years following 1945. A legacy of cultural opposition and 
resistance coexisted with a military anticommunist alliance. The tenden-
cy of American thought was to oppose democracy to socialist totalitari-
anism and so to expect Western Europe to join it unreservedly on the 
side of democracy. Europeans were more likely to view themselves as 
occupying a space between the authoritarian socialism of the USSR 
and the untrammeled capitalism of America.
The USA refused to support the military adventurism of Britain and 
France in the Suez Canal debacle. In the 1960s no European nation 
gave military support to the US in Vietnam.
The perception grew among US military and political circles that 
Europeans were unreliable allies. This intensified as the USA became 
increasingly the agent of global capital in the aftermath of the fall of the 
USSR. America became more distrustful of its allies the less it needed 
them. The more unchallenged American hegemony, the more America 
found itself alone and the more openly imperial became its behaviour.
From imperialism to Empire and from the nation-state to the 
political regulation of the global market: what we are witness-
sing, considered from the point of view of historical materia-
lism, is a qualitative passage in modern history. When we are 
incapable of expressing adequately the enormous importance 
of this passage, we sometimes quite poorly define what is hap-
pening as the entry into postmodernity. We recognise the 
poverty of the description, but we sometimes prefer it to others 
because at least postmodernity indicates the epochal shift in 
contemporary history.  
Hardt & Negri (2000)
The necessity for conflict to give meaning and function to political 
structures has become once again apparent as the uneasy - and never 
peaceful - peace of the cold war recedes.
The enduring attraction of war is this: Even with its destruction 
and carnage it can give us what we long for in life. It can give 
us purpose, meaning, a reason for living. Only when we are in 
the midst of conflict does the shallowness and vapidness of 
much of our lives become apparent. Trivia dominates our con-
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versations and increasingly our airwaves. And war is an enti-
cing elixir. It gives us resolve, a cause. It allows us to be noble.  
And those who have the least meaning in their lives, the impo-
verished refugees in Gaza, the disenfranchised North African 
immigrants in France, even the legions of young who live in the 
splendid indolence and safety of the industrialized world, are 
all susceptible to war’s appeal.
Hedges (2002)
European sensibility stands at a point from which it may develop in a 
number of directions, but there are good reasons to doubt whether that 
development will be sympathetic to that of the US.  
The multiculturalism of the market state is highly problematic. The 
USA has traditionally seen and portrayed itself as a “melting pot” of 
ethnicities but this is hardly reflected in the attitudes of its government.  
Increasingly, the USA is choosing to take a unilateral position in 
international affairs. It withdraws from existing treaties and declines to 
endorse new ones. It seeks to circumvent or, if necessary, simply ig-
nore, decisions of the United Nations.
The highest places within the American state and economy are in-
creasingly occupied by people with extreme right-wing evangelical 
Christian convictions. As Tariq Ali (2002) points out, two fundamen-
talisms face each other in the 21st century.  
The logical necessity of this structural conflict, this interdependence 
of enemies, is summarised by Gray (1997, 97):
Notice how important the enemy is, if war is to survive. With-
out an enemy thewre is no conversation. This is a realisation 
that warriors have never lost, although in modern times it has 
had to be disguised in the rationalisation that the function of 
war is making peace. Actually, war has always been a conver-
sation.   
An economically united Europe will be the largest single economic 
bloc in the world in the 21st Century.  It is entirely possible that the Euro 
will replace the Dollar as the main currency of international exchange.  
It would be entirely indicated that Europe and Russia will seek ever 
closer cooperation and mutual support. A key element in these develop-
ments will have to be a rapprochement between Europe’s nominally 
Christian (though largely, in practice, non-religious) majority and a large
Muslim minority. The admission of Turkey to the EU and the resolution 
of the war in Chechnya will make EU support for wars between US 
dominated international capital and Islam untenable.
One of the ways in which Europe has been perceived as faint-
hearted by its American ally is its comparatively low level of defence ex-
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penditure. While the constituent nations of the EU remain separate eco-
nomies, it would be very difficult for one of them to make big changes to 
its defence expenditure without destabilising its economic relationship 
within the Union. For a single European economy to do so would be 
entirely possible. There is no obvious reason that, if the EU satisfa-
ctorily integrates its economies, it could not equal or surpass the defe-
nce spending of any other power bloc by the middle of the century.  
An increasingly united and selfconsciously multiethnic and multicu-
ltural Europe, cautious about military adventurism and imperialism and 
profoundly secular, will find itself positioned culturally between the com-
peting fundamentalisms of Indian subcontinental political Islamism and 
the bible-belt capitalism of a simultaneously imperial yet solipsistic 
America. There is no foregone conclusion about the direction of Euro-
pean violence in the 21st century.
Why does all this matter? Haven’t war stoiries from the Iliad onw-
ards romanticidsed and heroised the grubby business of conflict?  
Hasn’t war reporting always been stagey propaganda? Haven’t all cul-
tures tinkered with their history to airbrush out their dishonorable deeds 
and to promote their manifest destiny?
Up to a point. The Iliad praises bravery and skill\ at arms but never 
seeks to avoid the grisly nature of combat:
Aeneas now charged in and with his sharp spear struck Ap-
harus son of Caletor on the throat, which happened to be 
turned towards him. The man’s head lolled on one side; he cru-
mpled up under his shield and helmet and soul-devouring Dea-
th engulfed him. Meanwhile Antilochus, seizing a moment 
when Thoon’s back was turned his way, leapt in and struck.  
He cut clean through the vein that runs right up the back to the 
neck. Thoon dropped backwards in the dust, stretching his 
hands out to his comrades in arms. Antilochus fell upon him 
and began to strip him of his armour; but with a wary eye, for 
Trojans were coming up on every side.
(Homer, 1950)
War reporting has been biased and partial from its beginning. If, as 
the cliché has it, the first casualty in war is the truth, that is at least in 
part because to a combatant, truth is less important than victory and in 
any culture that has mass communications, all citizens will be com-
batants in any war. The most up to date technologies and media will be 
employed for disinformation purposes. Thus in the American civil war, 
action photographs were staged and faked. In the 1914-18 Great Euro-
pean War, newsreel film of combat was scripted, rehearsed and acted.
Yet the manipulation of history for propaganda within popular culture 
is in some ways more pernicious. We expect “factual” accounts to be 
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biased. We know better than toi believe what we read in the papers.  
The more sceptical of us, confronted with stories of atrocities, mas-
sacres, rape camps and the like will look back over centuries of such 
allegations and reflect that they are as likely to be complete inventions, 
like the Germans bayoneting Belgian babies in 1914, as to be sober 
fact and that in very few if any wars is the use of atrocity restricted to 
one side. For a full account of the extent to which combat brutalizes all 
who engage in it, see Joanna Burke’s An Intimate History of Killing.
(2000)
But in entertainment, our guard is down and this is where mytho-
logy, in Barthes’ (1957) sense is created. Thus Pearl Harbor, Private 
Ryan, Schindler’s List and a host of other films all take place in an alter-
native history in which the second world war was fought by the USA 
and Britain as a moral crusade against the holocaust. The Russian 
sacrifice is totally elided. The indifference of the Allied governments to 
the plight of people in the death camps and their refusal to divert any 
paret of the war effort to disabling their assembly lines of death, despite 
the entreaties of the Jewish authorities is never mentioned.
Hollywood was condemned for simplifying history out of exi-
stence, reducing reality to a neatly dichotomised clash bet-
ween good and evil. Its stifling approach to human relation-
ships neglects a whole world of authentic and rich human ex-
perience, while its weakness for stereotypes risks leaving it dis-
connected from life as most people experience it. As a result 
the full possibilities of a medium that has the potential to be the 
most powerful ever employed remain unfulfilled. Ever more 
ambitious special effects cannot conceal the emptiness that 
lies at the centre of Hollywood's soul.
- Gledhill (2002)
It is the same prelapsarian world in which America was settled and 
populated by hard working, independent individualists in the name of 
freedom and equality, the embodiment of the European enlightenment.  
It disguises the bedrock of genocide and slavery that underpinned that 
settlement and its legacy, whereby the US imprisons a higher propo-
rtion of its citizens than any other country and a shockingly dispropo-
rtionate number of those so incarcerated are black. For a popular and 
populist, yet well researched polemic on this, see Moore, 2002.
Nor does Hollywood restrict itself to the rewriting of actual history.  
Even fiction may be deemed unsuitable. The recent film, Master and 
Commander: the Far Side of the World (Weir, 2003) is based on a novel 
(O’Brian, 1997) in which a Royal Navy ship, engaged in protecting Bri-
tish whalers, is in combat with a United States vessel:
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‘The French fleet is out,’ thought Stephen, three parts awake. ‘I 
must get to my instruments – go to my station – God between 
us and evil.’ Then waking a little more as his bare feet plunged 
into the rainwater swilling to and fro under his hanging cot, 
‘Nonsense. This is the New World, and we are at war with the 
Americans, ridiculous as it may appear.’
(O’Brian, 1997, 140)
and later:
Why, they saw the poor old Fox being fair pulled to pieces by 
an American frigate that was not only taking her new fore-
topmast out of her but also transferring what oil and spermaceti 
she had won … into another whaler
(O’Brian, 1997, 227)
In the film the action is transposed to the Napoleonic war and the 
enemy becomes a French privateer. Presumably it was felt that in a 
year that saw the Americans and British engaged in an action of ques-
tionable morality in the invasion of Iraq, in the teeth of French oppo-
sition, it would send confusing signals if the film reminded people that 
international alliances change over time and no nation always counts as 
the good guys.
Phillip Noyce’s film, The Quiet American (2002) made the mistake of 
sticking to the original text:
The release last Friday, albeit only in New York and Los An-
geles, of Philip Noyce's rendering of The Quiet American, Gra-
ham Greene's classic novel of 1955, was more significant than 
it might have seemed. Beyond the colour and intrigue of the 
film itself lies a story of studio intrigue and, indeed, cowardice. 
This is a work that nearly never saw the light of day, at least 
not in America.
The film, starring Michael Caine as a world-weary corres-
pondent in Vietnam in 1952, when France's hold on Indo-China 
was coming undone, was completed more than a year ago. But 
its distributor, Miramax, was afraid to put it out. Not because it 
is any kind of dud; on the contrary, now that it has finally sur-
faced, there is talk of an Oscar nomination for Caine. No, it 
was much worse than that. Miramax was nervous that the 
American public would be offended by it.
Usborne (2002)
In fact the film had a remarkably short run in most of the USA. It was 
off the screens of all major theatres within a couple of weeks of release.
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Meanwhile the non-white, non-English speaking world is mythology-
sed as intractably Other. All Arab Muslims (indeed all Arabs and all 
Muslims) are fanatical believers in an irrational creed and so potential 
terrorists. Because they are beyond reason, it is the duty of the White 
Man to rule them, to control and discipline. They are the “fluttered folk 
and wild … Half devil and half child”.
Only a few years previously, the people who could not be trusted to 
govern themselves were the Serbs.
The new phase in human history opened with NATO’s bom-
bing of Serbia on March 24 1999. “The new generation draws 
the line”, Tony Blair proclaimed, fighting “for values”, for “a 
new internationalism where the brutal repression of whole eth-
nic groups will no longer be tolerated” and “those responsible 
for such crimes have nowhere to hide”. NATO has unleashed 
the first war in history fought “in the name of principles and 
values”, Vaclav Havel declared … 
Chomsky (2000)
But, of course, wars are always fought in the name of principles and 
values. From the White Man’s Burden to the War on terror, a casual 
rhetoric of self-serving historical delusion and of racial superiority cloaks 
the naked use of power in self-interest. That world is reflected in the 
elisions and distortions that can be discerned in news reporting and in 
popular culture.  
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